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WELFARE REFORM AND THE 1973
NEW MEXICO LEGISLATION
JOSEPH GOLDBERG*
Welfare reform has become one of those issues so beclouded with
rhetoric and catchphrases as to be virtually incapable of rational
analysis.' Faced with the undeniable burgeoning of both the welfare
*Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. Any doubts as to the irrational depths to which debate over welfare reform has fallen
are removed by brief perusal of the Senate floor debates over the Nixon welfare reform
proposals, H.R. 1. Senator Jordan, in opposing any extension of benefits, quoted from an
employment advertisement in a North Carolina newspaper and stated:
Mr. President, these plants are begging for help. That is an advertisement
fzom just one. Many others have plenty of room for other workers. It is true
all over my State. It is certainly true in Washington, D.C. I know that. Just go
out and try to hire anyone to do some work around your house.
118 Cong. Rec. S.16829 (daily ed. October 4, 1972) (remarks of Senator Jordan). Senator
Jordan clearly articulated one of the dominant rhetorical themes in opposition to extension
of welfare benefits: "You can't get any good help these days." See Cong. Rec. S.16831-32
(daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (remarks of Senator Stennis). That the rhetoric had become so
metaphorical as to seriously impair intelligent and rational debate was evidenced by Senator
Chiles' remarks:
Mr. President, I have been on the floor for about two and a half hours now
trying to corner everyone I could corner, the staffs of committees, the staff of
the Senator from Illinois, and everyone else I could find, to try to understand
what the amendment of the Senator from Illinois does, what the amendment
of the Senator from Oklahoma is, and where we stand on this particular bill.
I can tell you, Mr. President, that I do not understand it now. I do not
know whether anyone else in here understands it either. But I know that every
other Senator who is off the floor does not understand it. What we are talking
about and what the Senate thinks is whether we will adopt a pilot plan and, if
so, what kind of pilot plan will we adopt.
M"r. President, I will bet that 80 percent of Senators do not understand that,
and they do not understand what we are talking about and what you have
been talking about, and what I have been trying to listen to. I wonder how
many Senators on the floor right now understand it. Your staffs do not. I have
been trying to talk to those to try to find out whether they understand it,
what we are dealing with here, we are dealing with a major question of reform,
but we are dealing with it in the 11th hour of this session, and we are dealing
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rolls and costs,2 it is understandable that welfare advocates and
administrators should be concerned. Indeed, there is a remarkable
unanimity of criticism of the present welfare system. Virtually the
entire spectrum of social attitude has gone on record as opposed to
the present system. Unanimity breaks down, unfortunately, when
positive suggestions for improvement are offered. Dissatisfaction
with the present system-not some common ideology or goal-unites
the critics.
It is the purpose of this article to set forth and criticize, against
the backdrop of federal and state reforms, the recent changes of
certain welfare programs in New Mexico. The article first discusses
the history of the federal intervention in and experience with income
assistance programs. Then the state experience with the administration of these .programs is discussed. In that historical context, the
new legislative developments are discussed and criticized.
TRENDS IN WELFARE REFORM
A. The FederalExperience
The business of providing income relief to the poor on any meaningful scale in the United States is of relatively recent origin. From
colonial times to the turn of the twentieth century, welfare relief
followed the scheme of the "Elizabethan Poor Laws," 3 which relegated the responsibility for providing relief, if any were to be provided at all, to local and regional governments." Relief programs
during this regime were characterized by poor farms and work houses
and by heavy reliance on private charity. Strongly influenced by
historical and ethical notions favoring self-reliance and the work
with it when we are talking and we cannot get anyone on the floor to understand it....
Mr. President, this is a heck of a way to do business. This is a heck of a way
to say that we are making headway with major reform in welfare....
Senators will walk in that door and feel that they are voting either on a
motion to table or this pending motion. They are no more going to understand
the provisions in that than anything in the world ....
118 Cong. Rec. S.16857-58 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (remarks of Senator Chiles).
2. The growth of welfare rolls and costs on the national level has been astronomical.
Thus, the rolls have grown from some 3.7 million persons in 1970 to 14.8 million persons in
1972. The concomitant costs rose from $6.5 billion to approximately $18.0 billion. 5 Nat'l
J.Rep. 1315 (1973).
3. 43 Eliz. I, c. 2 (1601).
4. See Riesenfeld, The Formatipe Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 Calif. L.
Rev. 175 (1955).
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ethic, these programs systematically avoided any direct financial relief to the poor-especially the able-bodied poor. It was not incidental or unintended that a system of relief which avoided direct
money stipends to the poor, which congregated any poor receiving
relief in work farms or work houses, and which provided at best only
marginal assistance, served as a potent and efficient device for regulation of the labor market. 5
It was not until the beginning of this century that the concept of
direct financial relief-in terms of money payments to the poor-was
given any serious consideration. As a direct result of the 1911 White
House Conference On Dependent Children, several states began experimenting with "Mothers' Pension" programs.' These programs
differed from previous relief programs in two important ways. First,
the state government, rather than local or county governments,
assumed the responsibility of providing assistance. Second, the form
of assistance was direct money payments. Of course, not all indigents
were deemed "worthy" of assistance under these new programs.
Eligibility was limited to mothers with dependent children. Although
most states eventually adopted some type of "Mothers' Pension"
program within twenty years of the White House Conference, few
funded the program to any meaningful degree. 7 These programs were
administered, in the words of Piven and Cloward, "to ensure that as
few of the poor as possible received as little as possible from it." 8
Thus, until the time of the Great Depression and the New Deal, relief
programs were administered and financed by state and local governments, sporadically maintained, and heavily reliant on private
charity, with direct money payments limited to the "worthy" poor.
The federal government pointedly disavowed any responsibility in
the area.
As with many other areas of social endeavor, the Great Depression
and New Deal were a watershed experience in the area of relief to
the poor. With as much as twenty-five percent of the workforce
unemployed, indigency and destitution came to the middle classes.9
Critics could no longer associate poverty exclusively with the slothful, dysfunctional, and deviant classes in society. This major social
dislocation had two important results on the development of income
relief programs. The first was the growing recognition that piecemeal
5.
6.
7.
8.

See Rosenheim, Vagrancy Concepts in Welfare Law, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 511 (1966).
See W. Bell, Aid to Dependent Children 6 (1965).
See F. Piven & R. Cloward, Regulating the Poor 4748 (1971).
Id. at 37.

9. See Id. at 48-57; cf. Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor:An Overview, 54 Calif. L.
Rev. 642 (1966).
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state and local responses to indigency were not sufficient to relieve
the effects of the Depression. The second result was that a massive
program for relief to the indigent was made politically feasible for
the first time in the nation's history. The confluence of these factors
with the philosophy of social innovation manifested by the New Deal
made the time ripe for a major change in the provision of assistance
to the poor.
This major change was embodied in the Social Security Act of
1935.' o In addition to providing the massive "social insurance" program for the aged (which soon came to be called "social security"),
the statute created four "categorical assistance" programs which
would provide income assistance to certain categories of poor persons: (1)the aged (OAA); 1 (2) the blind (AB);' 2 (3) the disabled
(AD);" and (4) "dependent children" (AFDC).'
Under the statute, the federal and state governments embarked on a scheme of
"cooperative federalism"' I to provide income relief to these
indigents. Under this scheme, the federal government assumed the
responsibility for providing a major share of the financing of the income assistance programs. The states would administer the programs,
but in consideration for the federal monies received, the states agreed
to do so in conformity with broad federal guidelines.
The scheme of "cooperative federalism" created by the Social
Security Act became the major theoretical characteristic of income
assistance programs for the next thirty-five years. While it was originally anticipated that the categorical assistance programs in the
Social Security Act would wither away, 1 6 these programs, and the
underlying poverty which necessitated them, stubbornly persisted.
Indeed, the three and one half decades since the inception of the act
have witnessed a slow, halting, but irreversible extension and expansion of these programs.
The years between 1940 and 1960 have been characterized as
years of stability in the administration of income assistance programs." The theory of cooperative federalism which placed supervisory responsibilities on the federal government in the administration of the programs was neglected in practice. The federal govern10. 42 U.S.C. § § 301 et. seq. (1970).
11. 42 U.S.C. § § 301 et. seq. (1970).

12. 42 U.S.C. § § 1201 et. seq. (1970).
13. 42 U.S.C. § § 1351 et. seq. (1970).
14. 42 U.S.C. § § 601 et. seq. (1970).
15. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
16. See F. Piven & R. Cloward, supra, note 7 at 80-117; R. Stevens, Statutory History of
the United States: Income Security 10 (1970).
17. See F. Piven & R. Cloward, supra note 7, at Part II.

November 1973]

WELFARE REFORM

ment; during this period, provided little or no supervision or
guidance to the state agencies administering the program. Little
supervision was found in the state courts, and virtually no supervision came from the federal courts. The result was that the states
were as free as they had been prior to 1935 in the administration of
these programs. Many states, as a consequence, utilized these programs to advance ends which were extraneous to, and in' many
instances inconsistent with, the legislative goals of the Social Security
Act. Large classes of persons who were eligible for assistance under
the federal guidelines were systematically excluded from the welfare
rolls by the state and local administrators. Eligibility requirements
were tailored at the state and local levels to fit only those persons
deemed "worthy" of assistance.' I Initial and continued eligibility
requirements were fashioned and administered in such a manner as to
socialize recipients according to the mores of the dominant culture." 9 What occurred in the interim between 1940 and 1960 was
not stability in the administration of these programs, but the creation of a wide divergence between the programs as they existed in
theory and as they were actually administered by the states.
Thus, the intervention of the federal government into the area of
income assistance programs to the poor did not bring about an
immediate realization of federal government responsibility in the
administration of its programs. The federal government, in the interim years between 1940 and 1960, was content to restrict its participation to financial contributions. No federal philosophy of
income maintenance evolved; there appeared to be no comprehensive
or cohesive approach to the problems of indigency by the federal
government. The only manifest federal interest in these programs
during that interim period was a piecemeal extension of the classes of
persons eligible for the categorical assistance programs under the
Social Security Act.2 0 It was not until the early 1960's that the
federal government interested itself again in. the structure and administration of these programs.
By the beginning of the 1960's both Congress and the public were
expressing concern at the rising welfare rolls and what has come to
18. The most restrictive administrative practices were effected in southern states and
were directed against Blacks. See F. Piven & R. Cloward,supra note 7, at 115-17.
19. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 Yale
L. J.1245, 1251-52 (1965).
20. Thus, the original 1935 act created only three categorical assistance programs. The
fourth program-Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled-was created in 1950. See 64

Stat. 555 (1950). Further, eligibility for AFDC was extended over a thirty-five year period
from children up to sixteen years to children up to twenty-one years. Compare 49 Stat. 629
(1935) with 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

be called the "cycle of dependency": 2 the occurrence of several
generations of the same family on the welfare rolls. It was becoming
apparent to both the administration and Congress that the income
assistance programs embodied in the Social Security Act, and the
underlying poverty which necessitated them, were not going to
wither away and that some more affirmative action would be necessary to break the "cycle of dependency." The theory of the Social
Security Act categorical assistance programs was to provide a
response to the symptoms of poverty. There were certain classes of
persons who were without the resources to maintain minimum subsistence. The categorical assistance programs met subsistence requirements by providing money. It must be remembered that these
programs were fashioned and enacted during the Great Depression,
an extraordinary social and economic dislocation in our society.
These were programs fashioned to meet the needs of what was perceived to be an extraordinary situation. It was assumed that if
enough money was provided these classes to get them through the
extraordinary situation of the depression, the natural expansion of
the economy and economic growth would ultimately take care of the
root problem of underlying poverty.2 2 Of course, the experience of
the twenty-five years following passage of the statute proved this
premise to be invalid. The federal government slowly became aware
that some initiative had to be made at the underlying problem: the
causes of poverty.
The response of the federal government to this new perception
was the 1962 amendments to the Social Security Act.2 3 These
amendments manifested the first substantial innovation in the philosophy and structure of income maintenance programs in a generation. The amendments embodied a comprehensive scheme of "social
services" designed to encourage and facilitate the recipients of income assistance programs in acquiring the wherewithal to remove
themselves from the relief rolls and become self-reliant.2" These
"social services" included family and birth control planning, job
training, and work incentives. Two important changes in the
philosphy and structure of income maintenance programs should be
noted in these amendments. The amendments reflected, first, an
effort to address some of the causes of poverty, as well as its symptoms, and second, an awakening federal concern in the administration of these programs.
21. See Moynihan, Annals of Politics (FamilyAssistance Plan I), The New Yorker, Jan.
13, 1973, at 36.
22. See R. Stevens, supra note 16, at 11.

23. 76 Stat. 172 (1962).
24. See R. Stevens, supra note 16, at 628-659.
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The Kennedy administration initiated the "social services" approach manifested by the 1962 amendments to the Social Security
Act. Although the initiative was not met with universal enthusiasm,
Congress was persuaded to enact the amendments partly on the explicit and implicit promises by the administration that the "social
services" approach would solve the problems of expanding welfare
rolls and costs.2 The next five years saw the implementation of the
"social services" approach. The late 1960's, however, also witnessed
two important developments concerning the administration of income assistance programs. The first was the intervention of the federal and state courts in reviewing the administration of these programs. The second was the growing disenchantment of the Congress
with the "social services" approach, in particular, and the entire
structure of the income assistance programs in general. While these
two developments are necessarily interrelated, for purposes of analysis they will be discussed separately.
As described above, the state and federal courts exercised little or
no supervision of the state administration of income assistance programs. Combined with the laissez-faire attitude of the federal administrative agencies, this lack of supervision left the states pretty much
free to administer these programs as they liked. The result was a wide
divergence between theory and reality in the administration of these
programs. The creation, in the mid-1960's, of the "War on Poverty"
and the O.E.O. legal services program resulted in the establishment of
a large corps of lawyers available to poor persons for the first time. It
was natural that, among other vital concerns, the primary focus of
attention would be the income assistance programs which provided
the most substantial single source of income to poor persons. These
new "lawyers for the poor" turned to the federal and state courts to
resolve the differences they perceived between the rights that were
theoretically established by the Social Security Act but which were
not being granted in the state administration of the programs. The
federal and state courts responded to this litigation by casting aside,
as either unconstitutiona 6 or in violation of federal Social Security
Act 2 ' requirements, longstanding state practices. The courts made it
abundantly clear to both the federal and state governments that the
practice of allowing the states to administer these programs as they
saw fit was not consistent with the scheme of "cooperative federalism" established by the Social Security Act. These court decisions
resulted in a "federalizing" of the administration of these programs:
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompsen, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
27. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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the states would have to conform their administration of these programs to the federal requirements. 2 This process severely restricted
the states' latitude in administering these programs, and concomitantly imposed new responsibilities on federal agencies. 2 9
The federalization of the administration of these programs, invoking the more liberal federal eligibility criteria and striking down the
more restrictive state eligibility criteria, resulted in an astronomical
increase in welfare rolls and costs. Congress, however, was reluctant
to view the increase in welfare rolls and costs as a consequence of
court invocation of Social Security Act rights which had consiftently
been disregarded by the states in their unfettered administration of
the programs. Rather, Congress appeared to view the burgeoning
costs as a failure of the "social services" approach to the administration of the programs. The disenchantment of Congress with the
"social services" approach and the perception of many of the advent
of "welfare statism" led Congress in the late 1960's to implement
more restrictive amendments to the Social Security Act. The 1967
amendments to the statute manifested an antagonistic Congressional
attitude to the administration of these programs and to the increase
in welfare rolls and costs. 0 Congress responded to these perceived
defects in the administration of the program by enacting legislation
which would put a ceiling on federal monies expended in income
assistance programs' and by enacting coercive work requirements
for recipients of these programs. a 2 While the failure in practice of
these restrictive amendments is well documented, 3 3 the point of
these amendments worthy of note is that they reflected a new atti28. Thus, King v. Smith establishes that, at least in the absence of Congressional
authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act
or its legislative history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons
eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social
Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971).
29. It is probably not coincidental that it was not until after the King v. Smith decision
that the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare started promulgating its
regulations in a formal manner in the Code of Federal Regulations, rather than leaving them
as they had been in the more informal Handbook of Public Assistance Administration. A
further indicator of increased federal activity is the conformity hearing, by which the
federal agency makes formal inquiry into whether a state is administering public assistance
programs in conformity with federal requirements. This potent tool for enforcing state
compliance was substantially dormant until the King v. Smith decision, but after that
decision saw a flurry of activity. See 1 C.C.H. Pov. L. Rep. 1850 and annotations.
30. See R. Stevens, supra note 16, at 804, 825.
31. See Pub. L. 90-248 § 208, 81 Stat. 894 (1967) repealed.
32. See Pub. L. 90-248 § 204, 81 Stat. 884 (1967).
33. See Comment, The Failure of the Work Incentive (WIN) Programs, 119 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 484 (1970).
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tude by the Congress, antagonistic to the structure and administration of the income assistance programs.
The 1967 amendments reflected only the beginning of the dissatisfaction with the programs. A new national administration, firmly
committed to fundamental changes in the income assistance pro34
These two critics
grams joined in the Congressional discontent.
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The "Nixon Welfare Reform" proposals, sent to Congress in
1970,11 marked the most substantial departure from the existing
philosophy and structure of income assistance programs in the
thirty-five years since the enactment of the Social Security Act.
3
Debate and rhetoric have surrounded these reform proposals. " Both
the advocates of welfare recipients and conservatives traditionally
antagonistic to income assistance programs immediately and consistently opposed the proposals. This article is not the place for a
detailed analysis of the merits or demerits of the proposals. What
should be noted here about them, however, is that they required a
substantial increase in the federalization of the income assistance
programs. The Nixon proposals would finance a uniform, nation37
If individual states desired to
-wide, minimum level of assistance.
provide assistance above the level, they could, but without substanwould
tial federal assistance. 38 In addition, the federal government
3 9
substantially assumed the administration of the programs.
The Nixon reform proposals marked the culmination of the steady
trend toward the federalization of income assistance programs.
Under these proposals, the primary responsibility for providing income assistance shifted from the state to the federal government.
34. See Moynihan, supra note 21, at 34-35; R. Stevens, supra note 16, at 884-88 (quoting Presidential Address to the Nation on Welfare Reform, Aug. 8, 1969).
35. H.R. 16311, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970). (Commonly called the Family Assistance
Plan [FAP] proposal.) With the defeat of the "FAP" proposal in the 91st Congress, the
Nixon administration made substantial modifications in its proposals and reintroduced them
to the 92nd Congress as H.R. 1. (Commonly referred to as Family Assistance Plan/Opportunities for Families [FAP/OFF] .)
36. See Moynihan, Annals of Politics (Family Assistance Plan, New Yorker, Jan. 13,
1973, at 34 (Part I); Jan. 20, 1973, at 60 (Part II); Jan. 27, 1973, at 57 (Part Ill).
37. See H.R. 1, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. § 401 [New Social Security Act § § 2101, 2113,
2131, 21521 (1971).
38. Id. [New Social Security Act § 2156).

39. See id. § 507.
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However, the proposals could not withstand the criticism leveled at
them from both the "right" and the "left"; and Congress twice rejected the Nixon reforms. In their stead, Congress separated the four
existing categorical assistance programs into two groups. As to the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program-which
accounts for more than 75% of the monies expended in income
assistance programs-Congress left the program to be administered in
much the same way as it had been for the past thirty-five years. As to
the other three categorical assistance programs-Aid to the Blind
(AB); Old Age Assistance (OAA); and Aid to the Disabled (AD)Congress grouped them into one categorical program (AABD) and
adopted the Nixon reform approach to its administration."' As of
January 1, 1974, these programs will be almost totally federalized.
The federal government will set a uniform, nationwide floor on the
level of assistance; the cost of which it will assume, and it will assume
the great part of the administration of the program.
The Nixon reform proposals may have manifested the high water
mark in the trend toward federalization. Their ultimate rejection and
the retention of the state administration of the AFDC program manifest a Congressional will that the states retain some administrative
latitude in the largest single income assistance program. Since there is
little likelihood that there will be any substantial reform of the
AFDC program emanating from either the administration or the Congress, any reform of the AFDC program must be sought at the state
level.
B. The New Mexico Experience
The New Mexico Department of Health and Social Services
(HSSD), charged with the administration of income assistance programs in this State, 4' has felt the impact of the shifting mores of
welfare administration over the past fifteen years. The trend toward
federalization of these programs, as described in the previous section,
has caused a steady attrition, in New Mexico as well as in other
states, of administrative discretion. Thus, there had to be made many
changes in administrative practices, where it was determined that the
state practices were in violation of requirements found in the federal
statute or regulations.4 2 Unlike welfare agencies in other states, however, HSSD has found its administrative practices coming under increasing attack as contrary to governing state statutes. To best under40. See Pub. L. 92-603 § 301 (Oct. 30, 1972).
41. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14 (Repl. 1968).
42. See, e.g., Saiz v. Hernandez, 340 F. Supp. 165 (D.N.M. 1972).
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stand this new development, one must be familiar with some of the
mechanics of welfare administration.
The determination of whether an individual applicant is eligible
for assistance may be broken down into two areas: (1) the determination of "non-need" eligibility; and (2) the determination of
"need" eligibility. The former describes the determination of
whether the applicant falls within that "category" of poor persons
intended to be aided by the program applied for. The Social Security
Act income assistance programs are called "categorical assistance programs" because it was the intention of Congress that not all indigents
be assisted under the programs, but only certain categories of indigents, namely, the aged, the blind, the disabled and dependent children. On the other hand, a single adult who does not suffer some
disability, and who is not aged, would not be eligible for assistance
under any of the four Social Security programs. It is in the area of
"non-need" eligibility determination that the recent "federalizing"
of administration of income assistance programs has had its greatest
impact. It has become fairly well established that the federal defmitions of the category of indigents to be assisted through a particular
program are exclusive and cannot be varied by the states, unless there
is a clear manifestation in the federal statute that Congress intended
the states to have some discretion.4 '
The area of "need" eligibility involves determining whether a
particular applicant is sufficiently indigent to warrant assistance
through the program applied for. This determination basically involves a comparison between the applicant's resources and income
against what the state determines a person in the applicant's situation
needs. If the applicant's income and resources are insufficient to
meet his or her needs, as determined by the State, then the applicant
is sufficiently "needy" to warrant assistance. While the "federalizing" of the administration of these programs has severely limited
the discretion of state administration in the "non-need" area of
eligibility determination, the states' discretion in the "need" area is
left substantially unchallenged:
There is no question that States have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is free to set its own
standard of need and to determine the level of benefits by the
amount of funds it devotes to the program. 44
Yet, it is this area of "need" eligibility that HSSD has found itself
under attack, as acting contrary to state statutes.
43. See Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
44. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. at 318-19; see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1969).
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Until July 1, 1973, the state statutory provision governing "need"
eligibility for the income assistance programs offered by HSSD provided in pertinent part:
Public assistance-Qualifications.-Public assistance shall be
granted under this act to any needy person who:
(a) Has not sufficient income or other resources to provide a
reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health.4 5
One must turn to applicable HSSD regulations to determine how this
statutory standard was being implemented. Under HSSD regulations,
the eligibility determination was made through a four-step process.
First, the agency determined the applicant's "needs" by looking to a
regulatory determination of the cost of providing current requirements for a person in the applicant's circumstances.4 6 The basic
requirements that the agency considered were food, shelter, clothing
and personal incidentals.4 ' Next, the agency determined the applicant's resources and income.' 8 Third, the agency made a determination as to whether these resources and income were "available" to
meet the applicant's needs.4 I Finally, the available income and
resources were compared against the determined needs of the applicant: if the available resources and income were less than the determined needs, the applicant met the eligibility requirement, and vice
versa.
Two points should be noted about this process. First, the determination of what a particular applicant needs in order to provide for
current requirements (other than shelter expenses) is a presumptive
standard. Rather than conduct an investigation into what a particular
applicant in fact needs, the department has published regulations
that set forth as a conclusive presumption what an individual in any
given set of circumstances needs per month for current requirements.
Thus, for example, if a mother with two children, applies for assistance under the AFDC program, rather than looking to what it
would actually cost the mother to provide for requirements of food,
clothing and personal incidentals each month, the administrator
looks to the regulations which give a dollar figure presumptively
necessary to provide for those needs. On the other hand, the administrator determines the income and resources of an applicant through
case-by-case investigation. Given this practice of comparing actual
45. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-1-11 (Repl. 1968) (since repealed).
46. See, e.g., N.M. Dep't of Health & Soc. Serv. Manual (hereinafter cited as HSSD
Manual) § 231.82.
47. See, e.g., id.

48. See, e.g., id. § 231.83.
49. See, e.g., id. § 231.831(i)(C).
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resources and income against presumptive needs, it could be anticipated that a rigid application of these regulatory formulae might run
afoul of the statutory standard that assistance must be provided to a
person who "has not sufficient income or other resources to provide
a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health."' 0
The case of Joaquin Baca' illustrates the point. Mr. Baca had
been receiving income assistance pursuant to the state's old age assistance program. His sole source of income, other than the state
income assistance program, was his Social Security benefits.' 2 Prior
to June 1, 1971, Mr. Baca's Social Security benefits amounted to
$105.80 a month. Since the regulatory standard of need under the
state's old age assistance program for a person in Mr. Baca's circumstances was $116.00 a month, Mr. Baca was considered eligible for
assistance under the program. As a result, Mr. Baca was granted a
check of $10.20 a month. Mr. Baca was also eligible for assistance
under the State's Medicaid program, 5 3 eligibility for which was
conditioned soley on whether the person was eligible for assistance
under one of the state's categorical income assistance programs. This
Medicaid assistance was very important to Mr. Baca since he was in
his seventies and required a heart pacemaker in order to counteract a
serious heart disease.
In June 1971, Mr. Baca's Social Security benefits were increased
to $116.40 a month. This seemingly charitable act on the part of
Congress worked a disastrous effect on Mr. Baca. Mr. Baca's income
was now forty cents more than the regulatory standard of need for a
person in his circumstances. 54 He was determined no longer eligible
50. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-1-11 (RepL 1968) (since repealed).
51. Baca v. N.M. Health & Soc. Serv. Dep't, 83 N.M. 703, 496 P.2d 1099 (Ct. App.),

cert. denied, 83 N.M. 699,496 P.2d 1095 (1972).
52. These were benefits pursuant to the Federal Old Age, Services and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Program, commonly referred to as "social security." See 42 U.S.C. § § 401 et

seq. (1964).
53. See text accompanying footnotes 75 through 80, infra.
54. The problem faced by Mr. Baca is one caused by the interplay of the various
government programs designed to provide income maintenance and security. While
OASDI is not generally considered to be a "welfare" program, there is a substantial overlap
between recipients of the OASDI benefits and recipients of benefits from the categorical
assistance program. Since the amount of assistance granted to a beneficiary of one of the
categorical assistance programs is determined, in part, by the amount of income available to
the recipient, fluctuations in OASDI benefits will normally result in changes in the categorical assistance benefits. Thus, when Congress raises OASDI benefits the Congressional intent
must be, at least in part, that OASDI beneficiaries should have more income to spend. Yet,
if the OASDI beneficiary is also a beneficiary of a categorical assistance program, his or her
categorical assistance grant will be reduced by an amount equal to the increase in OASDI
benefit, thus leaving the recipient in no better position. Often, as in Mr. Baca's case, the
recipient will be in a worse position, where the OASDI benefit increase puts the beneficiary's available income above the categorical program's standard of need. This apparent
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for old age assistance. As a result, he lost his eligibility for the State
Medicaid program which had provided him with substantial and
vitally necessary benefits. First, it paid the $5.60 a month premiums
for the federal Medicare program. In addition, the state Medicaid
program provided assistance for the twenty percent excess in medical
costs that were not borne by the federal Medicare program. Since Mr.
Baca had a serious heart problem and continuing medical bills, eligibility for the state Medicaid program had provided substantial assistance to him.
Before proceeding further with Mr. Baca's case, we should look
more closely at Mr. Baca's problem. Before the June 1971 increase in
Social Security benefits, Mr. Baca's monthly needs were considered
to be $116.00 for food, shelter, clothing and personal incidentals;
$5.60 for federal Medicare premiums; (and assuming for purposes of
discussion that Mr. Baca had $50.00 a month expenses for medical
care and medication) $10.00 for the twenty percent excess in
medical expenses that federal Medicare did not cover. Thus, his total
monthly needs amounted to $131.60. His resources to meet these
needs broke down as follows: $105.80 a month from Social Security
benefits; $10.20 a month from state old age assistance; and $15.60 a
month from state Medicaid assistance. Mr. Baca's needs and his
resources balanced. However, after the 1971 increase in Social Secuanomaly has been deplored over the past several years by various interest groups. Their
attack has been on two points: (1) The result frustrates the manifest intent of Congress in
raising OASDI benefits; and (2) the result is fundamentally unfair, in that it creates different
results among two classes of persons similarly situated; in that OASDI beneficiaries who are
not recipients of categorical assistance programs have more spendable income, while OASDI
beneficiaries who are also categorical assistance beneficiaries have not.
These arguments are not self-evident, however. The first point begs the question. While it
is reasonably inferable that in raising OASDI benefits, Congress had the intent that the class
of OASDI beneficiaries should have more spendable income, it must be assumed that Congress was aware, in raising such benefits, of the mechanics of the categorical assistance
programs (programs Congress itself created) and what the result of such OASDI benefit
raises would be for joint beneficiaries of both programs. Thus, at best, any intent of
Congress is ambiguous. As to the second point, any resultant unfairness is also not axiomatic. The comparison between joint OASDI/categorical assistance beneficiaries and just
OASDI beneficiaries demonstrates what appears to be an unjust difference in treatment.
However, if the focus of comparison is changed to joint OASDI/categorical assistance
beneficiaries and just categorical assistance beneficiaries, not only is there no apparent
difference in treatment, but also, to work the opposite result and not to reduce categorical
assistance benefits to reflect the increase in OASDI benefits works an apparent unfair
difference in treatment between these two classes. In such a situation, the joint OASDI/
categorical assistance beneficiaries will end up with more spendable income than the beneficiaries of just the categorical assistance program.
Despite the apparent Hobson's dilemma, Congress appears to have selected the latter
alternative as the least evil. In recent legislation increasing OASDI benefits, Congress has
explicitly directed that such increases are not to be considered available income for computing categorical assistance benefits. See Pub. L. 92-603 § 301 (New Social Security Act
§ 306) (Oct. 30, 1972).
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rity benefits, a striking imbalance occurred. His monthly needs
remained the same at $131.60. However, his monthly income
showed a drastic decrease. He received only $116.40 from Social
Security benefits. Since he was no longer eligible for old age assistance, he received no assistance from that program; and since his
eligibility for state Medicaid assistance was keyed to his eligibility for
old age assistance, he was no longer eligible for state Medicaid benefits. By some fiscal legerdemain, the increase in Mr. Baca's Social
Security benefits resulted in a decrease of more than ten percent in
his total monthly resources. A ten percent decrease in income for
any individual is bad enough. Where that individual derives his
income soley from federal and state assistance programs (thereby
insuring that his income is geared to providing only the most basic
and minimum provisions for subsistence, such a decrease is disastrous. Moreover, the fifteen dollar decrease in Mr. Baca's monthly
income had formerly provided for his- medical needs, necessary to
maintain his health.
Despite this anomalous result, the state administrators, HSSD,
declared Mr. Baca ineligible for old age assistance and thereby state
Medicaid assistance. Represented by legal services attorneys, Mr.
Baca appealed this determination to the state administrative Appeals
Review Committee. From an unfavorable determination from this
committee, Mr. Baca appealed to the Court of Appeals of New
Mexico.
The Court of Appeals was more sympathetic to Mr. Baca's problem than was HSSD. The court noted the imbalance in his income
and needs and further noted that continued medical treatment was
necessary in order for Mr. Baca to live. Applying the statutory standard that assistance was to be provided to a person who "has not
sufficient income or other resources to provide a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health,"' I the Court of Appeals
found the decision that Baca was not eligible for assistance to be
contrary to the legislative mandate:
Current needs prior to the Social Security benefits increase were
established at $116.00. Additionally the Department paid the Medicare insurance premiums and the 20% not covered by insurance. The
Department had determined Baca needed $56.00 per month for the
common requirement and utilities (Regulation 231.81(AX2) and
$60.00 per month is allotted for the basic requirements (Regulation
231.81(AX1), thus making a total of $116.00 for ". . .subsistence

compatible with decency and health." However, in order to subsist
(live) he must continue his medical treatment. The cost of the pre55. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-1-11 (Repl. 1968) (since repealed).
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mium reduces his availabale resouces below his determined need.
Baca does not in fact have "resources available" to meet his monthly
needs as determined by the Department. Regulation 231.83; Regula.
tion 231.81 (B).5 6
It is hard to quarrel with the court's result in this case. The
opinion, however, is not a model of clarity. The court did not state
specifically whether it was the administrative regulations, in themselves, which were contrary to the controlling legislation or whether
the application of those regulations to Mr. Baca's situation was-done
in some wrong manner. Additionally, the Court of Appeals' did not
point to specific regulations which were invalid either on their face
or in their application. Essentially, the defect in the Court of
Appeals' decision in this case was its failure to note the interrelationship between "need" and "income and resources" in making an
eligibility determination.
The Court of Appeals clearly recognized and appreciated the overall picture of Mr. Baca's situation. They saw and noted that prior to
the 1971 increase in Social Security benefits Mr. Baca had resources
available to him (through the federal Social Security benefits; state
old age assistance benefits; and state Medicaid benefits) to meet his
food, clothing, shelter, personal incidentals and medical needs. Yet
after the Social Security benefit increase and with the declared ineligibility for state old age and Medicaid assistance, he would not
have sufficient resources available to meet those same needs. It was
this imbalance which the court found incompatible with the legislative mandate. The reasoning which led to this conclusion, however, is
not free from ambiguity.
The court noted that the only needs comprehended by the standard of need for old age assistance were food, shelter, clothing and
personal incidentals. The court appeared to accept that it was not
mandatory that the standard of need comprehend medical needs.
The court appeared to reason, however, that where it was evident
that medical needs had to be provided for, in order to maintain life
or health, the money necessary to maintain those medical needs was
not "available" to meet the needs of food, clothing, shelter and personal incidentals included in the old age assistance standard of need.
Since Mr. Baca was required to divert approximately fifteen dollars a
month to meet these medical needs, they were not available for the
other needs. Hence, Mr. Baca's available resources were not $116.40
a month, but approximately $101.00 a month. Therefore, his available resources were less than his needs and he was eligible for old age
assistance.
56. 83 N.M. at 705.
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It is hard to understand why the Court of Appeals in Baca did not
simply find that the legislative standard expressly mandated that an
individual's medical needs be comprehended in the regulatory standard of need formulated for the income assistance programs administered under the statute. And, that since the regulatory standard of
need for old age assistance did not account for medical needs, it was
in conflict with the controlling legislation and therefore was illegal.
This line of reasoning would have served to reach the same result the
court reached in Baca and would have done it in a more expeditious
manner. In any event, even if the Court of Appeals' reasoning that
the old age assistance regulatory standard of need does not comprehend medical needs is accepted, it is clear that a necessary corollary
of the Baca decision is that medical needs are comprehended in the
statutory standard of need, evidenced by Section 13-1-11 of the New
Mexico statutes, and that income diverted to meet this need cannot
be considered available to meet the needs itemized in the regulations.
A hypothetical situation best illustrates this point. If Mr. Baca had
purchased a new television set on time payments and thereby contracted to pay fifteen dollars a month to the television merchant, one
could confidently assume that neither the administrative agency nor
the courts would look favorably on his claim that this fifteen dollars
a month was not available to meet his needs of food, clothing, shelter
and personal incidentals, comprehended by the old age assistance
regulations. Yet, he is legally bound to make the payments for the
television and therefore does not have that money available to meet
the needs of food, shelter, clothing and personal incidentals. What is
the difference between this situation and the diversion of resources
to meet medical needs? The obvious difference lies in the fact that
the statutory standard is expressed in terms of health and decency.
Medical needs are clearly related to that standard while entertainment needs (a television) may not be. Thus, the only manner in
which the courts can differentiate between various diversions of
resources to determine whether such diversions should be found to
mean that income is not available to meet the needs itemized in the
regulations, is to test the diversion to see if it is meeting a need comprehended in the statute. If the diversion of resources is necessary to
meet a need comprehended by the statute, then that money cannot
be considered available to meet different needs itemized in the regulatory standard; if the diversion is utilized to meet a need not comprehended by the statute, then it can still be considered available to
meet the needs itemized in the regulatory standard.
If Mr. Baca's situation were an isolated instance, one might be
tempted to consider it the product not of administrative policy, but
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rather of careless or overzealous administration. Unfortunately, that
is not the case. Another case, Chavez v. New Mexico Health and Soc.
Serv. Dept.,'
substantially identical to the Baca situation, arose
within a year of the Baca decision. Again HSSD terminated assistance
and again the case came before the Court of Appeals. The court reversed the agency determination and held that income necessarily
diverted for needed medical expenses could not be considered "available" to meet the needs comprehended by the regulatory standard.
The reasoning adopted by the Court of Appeals in the second decision was no more helpful than the reasoning in the Baca decision in
clearing up the ambiguities. What is more important in the Chavez
case, however, is the apparent disregard the HSSD officials had for
the Baca decision. Not only did they not feel compelled to follow
the Baca mandate in making the administrative decision, but when
the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the HSSD officials
totally ignored the previous Baca decision in making their arguments
to the Court of Appeals.
The court did not accept this apparent slight lightly. In a concurring opinion, one of the Appeals Court Judges made it a point to
specifically note the "refractoriness" of the administrative agency:
In this state of the record, I would have caused contempt citations
to be issued by this court directed to the attorneys and high administrative officials identified of record to require an explanation of
why HSS has systematically avoided acknowledging the existence of
a decision to which HSS was a party, which decision was final prior
to pertinent events in this case. Alternatively, I would have reversed
the HSS decision in this case because of violation of Rules of Appellate Procedure .... s8
While one can sympathize with an appellate court judge on what he
perceives to be contumacious conduct of the department in ignoring
a previous decision of that very court, one is more troubled by the
effect the attitude of the administrative agency has on the applicants
for and recipients of assistance.
Thus, by the time of the 1973 New Mexico legislative session,
state welfare administration was in the throes of a crisis. Its administrative discretion severely limited, on the one hand, by the increasing
federalization of non-need eligibility requirements and its administrative practices in need eligibility determinations under attack by
the state courts, HSSD was fighting the battle on two fronts. It is not
57. 84 N.M. 734, 507 P.2d 795 (Ct. App.), aff'd as moot, 12 Adv. Sh. 403 (1973)
(semble).
58. Id. at 736.
59. Laws of New Mexico, Ch. 376 (1973).
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surprising that welfare administration would be of primary concern
to the legislature.
THE NEW MEXICO LEGISLATION
The New Mexico legislature enacted two major pieces of welfare
legislation in 1973. One-a series of amendments" to the "Public
Assistance Act" 6 o-revised the statutory framework for the income
assistance programs administered by HSSD. The other-the "Special
Medical Needs Act" 6 -created a new program to provide medical
assistance to certain classes of needy persons.
Since New Mexico has no formal processes for determining legislative history, it is impossible to determine authoritatively the legislative purposes and goals underlying those new statutes" However,
one can feel reasonably confident that the growing trend toward
federalization of the social security categorical assistance programsespecially the proposed federal takeover of the AABD programs-was
one important factor. Further, it is fairly clear that the mounting
resistance of the state courts to the HSSD administration was not
lost on the legislature. Finally, the passage, in the 1972 legislative
session, of the state Equal Rights Amendment created an opportunity to reconsider welfare administration.6 2 The remainder of this
article will discuss the two pieces of welfare legislation passed in
1973. The statutes will be discussed separately; first setting forth the
general statutory scheme, then- discussing in detail the significant
provisions of the statutes with a view towards uncovering any administrative or litigational problems that might be posed by the changes.
A. The 1973 Amendments to the "PtiblicAssistance Act"
Senate Bill 374, as amended, made substantial changes in the existing statutory framework for the administration of public assistance
programs in New Mexico. In attempting to read the act, one encounters difficulty in determining the mechanical scheme of administration, for perhaps the primary characteristic of this new statute is
its disjointed and haphazard structure. Thus, in order to read the
statute intelligently, one must piece together from various sections
the fabric of administration.
Aside from strictly "housekeeping" provisions, the 1973 amendments to the Public Assistance Act may be divided into five separate
60. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 13-1-1 et seq. (Repl. 1968).

61. Laws of New Mexico, Ch. 311 (1973).
62. See Goldberg and Hale, The Equal Rights Amendment and the Administration of

Income Assistance Programsin New Mexico, 3 N.M. L. Rev. 84 (1973).
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areas. These are: (1) statutory authorization for programs; 63 (2)
standards for non-need eligibility determinations; 6 4 (3) standards for
need eligibility determinations;"' (4) the mechanics of determining
how much assistance will be granted; 6 ' and (5) miscellaneous matters in the administration of the programs." 7
1. Authorized Programs
The 1973 amendments authorize the Department of Health and
Social Services to engage in seven different assistance programs.
These are: (1) Aid to families with Dependent children (AFDC);6 8
(2) Aid to the Blind (AB);6 1 (3) Aid to the Disabled (AD);"0 (4) Old
Age Assistance (OAA);'' (5) General Assistance (GA);"2 (6) Food
Stamps;"3 and (7) Medical Assistance (Medicaid)." 4 The first five of
these programs are income maintenance programs, whereby the state
provides cash payments to eligible recipients. The last two programs-Food Stamps and Medicaid-do not provide cash, but rather
provide, respectively, coupons which may be used to purchase food
and medical services. Medical services are provided by private practitioners who are paid directly by the state. Programs (1) through (4)
and (6) and (7) are co-operative federal-state programs. The federal
government contributes to the funding of the program and the state
agrees to administer the program within federal guidelines. Program
(5)-the General Assistance Program-is a wholly state funded program for providing income assistance to needy persons not eligible
for the other income assistance programs.
One might suppose that the statutory authorizations for programs
would pose no problems either in substance or in draftsmanship.
Unfortunately, however, this is not the case with the 1973 amendments; they are fraught with uncertainties, ambiguities and downright problems. Take, for example, the Medical Assistance Programs.
Under the federal Social Security Act, two separate medical assistance programs are available to the states for adoption. Under both
of these programs, the federal government provides substantial finan63. Laws of New Mexico, Ch. 376 § § 6,7, 8,9,10,14,16 (1973).
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 14(c)-(f), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
§ § 3,4(a)-(b).
§ § 5, 11.
§ § 12, 13, 15, 17, 18.

68. Id. § 9.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§
§
§

8.
7.
6.
10.
14.
16.
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cial support. One-called the "Categorically Needy" Medicaid program-keys eligibility for medical assistance to eligibility for one of
the Social Security Act categorical assistance programs. 7 s Thus,
under this program, if a person is eligible for AFDC, AB, AD, or
OAA, he or she is automatically eligible for Medicaid benefits. The
other program-called the "Medically Needy" Medicaid programkeys eligibility to an income determination that the individual
7 6 does
not have sufficient resources to meet his or her medical needs.
The 1973 amendments authorize HSSD to engage in a program to
"provide medical assistance to persons eligible for public assistance
programs under the federal act."' 7 ' Quite simply, this provision
authorizes HSSD to operate only the "Categorically Needy" Medicaid program under the Public Assistance Act. The Department is
not authorized to adopt the "Medically Needy" Medicaid program.
This, in itself, is perfectly all right, since there is no requirement that
states adopt the "Medically Needy" program. 78 However, the other
piece of welfare legislation passed in the 1973 legislative session
creates a "Special Medical Needs" program, 79 also to be administered by HSSD. Yet, not only is there no mention of this other
program in the 1973 amendments to the Public Assistance Act, but
the statute is written in such a way as to apparently limit the
authority of the Department, in engaging in medical assistance programs, to the "Categorically Needy" Medicaid program.
Can this apparent conflict be resolved? Certainly, it can be argued
that the 1973 amendments to the Public Assistance Act could not
comprehend the "Special Medical Needs" programs, since the legislation creating that program was being considered simultaneously with
the 1973 amendments to the Public Assistance Act. Therefore, the
absence of any mention of this program in the 1973 amendments to
the Public Assistance Act should not be construed to deprive the
Department of authority to operate the program. This, however,
does not assist in determining the relationship of the "Special Medical Needs" program to the "Categorically Needy" Medicaid program
or to the Social Security Act. While the "Special Medical Needs" program will be discussed in detail later, it should be noted that the
legislative framework for the program is somewhat similar to a
"Medically Needy" Medicaid program under the Social Security Act.
However, the enabling legislation for the "Special Medical Needs"
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1970).

76. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10(B) (1970).
77. Lawsof New Mexico, Ch. 376 § 16 (1973).
78. See Fullington v. Shea, 320 F. Supp. 500 (D. Colo. 1970), afrd 404 U.S. 963

(1971).
79. Laws of New Mexico, Ch. 311 (1973).
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program apparently contemplates the program to be wholly statefunded, and makes no reference to authorizing HSSD to cooperate
with the federal government in establishing and administering it.
While the Public Assistance Act does authorize HSSD to cooperate
with the federal government in establishing and administering programs, 8" the 1973 amendments specifically-and one might presume,
pointedly-omitted any authorization for a "Medically Needy"
Medicaid program.'I It is certainly not clear why the legislature
would specifically refuse to cooperate in the "Medically Needy"
Medicaid program, where substantial federal financial support was
available, and then set up a substantially identical program to be
funded exclusively with state monies. Yet, apparently that is precisely what occurred. One may only speculate that the right legislative hand did not know what the left legislative hand was doing. In
any event, this peculiar legislative lacuna seriously calls into question
the legitimacy of any attempt by HSSD to obtain federal funding for
the "Special Medical Needs" program or a "Medically Needy"
Medicaid program under the Social Security Act. This entire problem, of course, could have been avoided quite simply by drafting the
1973 amendments to the Public Assistance Act in such a way as to
authorize HSSD to operate medical assistance programs, without
specifically limiting the authority to the "Categorically Needy"
Medicaid program. It is suggested that the next legislative session
clear up any such confusion by making such an amendment.
A similar, but substantially more critical problem arises in connection with the authorization for the Department to operate the AD,
AB and OAA programs. Each of the statutory authorizations for
these programs continues: "Until January 1, 1974.

- ."

2

The obvi-

ous impact of these provisions is that after January 1, 1974, the
Department is no longer authorized to operate or administer the AD,
AB and OAA programs.
The reason why the legislature limited authorizations for these
programs to January 1, 1974, is perfectly clear. In the fall preceding
the 1973 legislative session, the federal Congress enacted amendments to the Social Security Act promising a federal takeover of the
funding and administration of these three categorical assistance
programs.8 3 Obviously, the drafters of the 1973 amendments to the
Public Assistance Act, in writing these provisions, and the legislature,
in passing them, were relying on the promised federal takeover of
80. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-1-4(e) (Repl. 1968).

81. See Laws of New Mexico, Ch. 376, § 16 (1973).
82. Id. § § 6, 7, 8.

83. Pub. L. 92-603 § 301 (Oct. 30, 1972).
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those programs. Anyone experienced with the federal administration
of welfare programs would not have been so quick to rely on such
promises. And, as could have been predicted, such reliance was misplaced. In July 1973, Congress passed legislation requiring the states
to supplement the benefits paid by the federal government to OAA,
AD, and AB recipients after the federal takeover in January 1974.84
The July, 1973, federal legislation poses a critical problem for the
State. The 1973 amendments to the Public Assistance Act clearly
state that HSSD has no authority to administer or fund the AD, AB
and OAA programs after January 1, 1974. Yet the federal legislation
clearly calls for further funding by the state after January 1, 1974.
Moreover, if the state does not come forward with the supplemental
funding, it will be cut off from its federal contribution for the
5 Since the continued
"Categorically Needy" Medicaid program.'
federal contribution to the funding of the medicaid program is an
immensely attractive incentive, one can suspect that HSSD will
attempt to set up the supplemental benefits for the AD, AB and
OAA recipients after January 1, 1974, despite the lack of any statutory authorization for such funding. To do this, however, will require
an apparent disregard for state law on the part of both HSSD and the
federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare. If this feat can
be accomplished, one suspects that HSSD officials will be holding
their collective breaths hoping no one challenges the arrangement.
Regardless of the outcome, these developments point out quite
poignantly the lack of wisdom with which these provisions of the
1973 amendments to the Public Assistance Act were drafted. Any
problems-and anxieties-could easily have been avoided by omitting
the language in the statute limiting authorization for the AD, AB and
OAA programs to January 1, 1974. It would have been better to
have drafted these provisions authorizing HSSD to operate such programs as long as necessary. Certainly, if the promised federal takeover were to occur, HSSD would discontinue operations of any such
programs, since there would no longer be a need for them. Why the
legislature felt this need to hamstring the administrative agency with
this limiting language is open to question.
2. Non-Need Eligibility.
The provisions of the 1973 amendments to the Public Assistance
Act concerning non-need eligibility for the various programs pose
little change in substance from the pre-existing law. The legislative
scheme, however, is somewhat confusing. Section 4 (C-F) of the
84. Pub. L. 93-66 § 212 (July 9, 1973).
85. Id.
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statute apparently sets forth non-need eligibility requirements common to all programs. Further, Sections 6 through 10 set forth nonneed eligibility requirements peculiar to specific programs. As to the
four categorical assistance programs-AB, AD, OAA and AFDCeligibility requirements track the federal requirements. Such tracking, of course, reflects the trend toward federalization of all eligibility requirements.
There is an interesting dichotomy, however, between the drafting
of the eligibility provisions for the four categorical assistance programs 8 6 and General Assistance 7 and the provisions concerning
Food Stamps"8 and medical assistance. 8 9 As to the former, the
statute sets forth the eligibility requirements in specific detail. As to
the latter, no non-need eligibility criteria are set forth, but rather are
left to be developed by HSSD by regulation. Why there is this inconsistency in the statute is unclear. It would have been preferable,
however, if the statute had not sought to set forth eligibility criteria
in detail for any program, but, instead, had delegated that task to the
administrative agency to accomplish by way of regulation. The
desirability of this latter course is obvious. Over the past five years
there have been many changes in the interpretation of federal eligibility requirements. 9" If the state requirements are set forth by
regulation, it is an easy matter to conform the state requirements to
the changing federal requirements. Where, however, the state requirements are embodied in statute, any changes in the federal requirements necessitates the onerous procedure of legislative amendment to conform the state requirements to the federal. 9'
A further criticism may be made that the drafters went into much
greater detail than is necessary or desirable. Thus, one of the nonneed eligibility criteria common to all programs is that the recipient
"not [be] an inmate of any public non-medical institution
at the
time of receiving assistance. .'..92 One can only wonder what important public policy necessitated this provision. First, it is not likely
86. Laws of New Mexico, Ch. 376, § § 6, 7, 8, 9 (1973).
87. Id. § 10.
88. Id. § 14.
89. Id. § 16.
90. See, e.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
91. Section 17 of the 1973 amendments to the Public Assistance Act, Laws of New
Mexico, Ch. 376, § 17, apparently anticipates this problem by providing that where a
conflict exists between any section of the Public Assistance Act and federal statutes or
regulations, the operation of the state statutory provision will be suspended upon certifica-

tion of the State Attorney-General. This provision may be sufficient, as a temporary measure, where the controlling federal law acts to prohibit an established state practice. It is
unclear, however, that this provision would be helpful, even as a temporary measure, where
the federal law mandates the state to do something not otherwise authorized.

92. Id. § 4(e).
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that the situation will arise very often. It is difficult to imagine a
situation where an inmate at a public institution would meet the
other eligibility criteria set forth. Second,.this eligibility criterion may
be inconsistent with controlling federal criteria for the AFDC program. A number of federal courts have recently held that pregnant
women are eligible for AFDC benefits prior to the birth of the
infant."a If such a pregnant woman met the other "non-need" and
"need" eligibility criteria, it is arguable under these decisions that the
state may not deprive her of eligibility merely because she is an
inmate at a public non-medical institution-such as a juvenile home
or "run-away" detention center.
3. Need Eligibility.
Sections 3 and 4 of the 1973 amendments to the Public Assistance
Act deal with determining "need" eligibility for the program administered by the Department. Since there are no specific "need"
eligibility criteria set forth in other provisions peculiar to individual
programs, it is apparent that the criteria set forth in Sections 3 and 4
are common to all the programs. Pursuant to Section 4(A) of the
statute, an individual meets the "need" eligibility criteria if his or her
"non-exempt income is less than the applicable standard of need."
Thus, this provision does not deviate from the pre-existing method of
determining need eligibility. As classified above, however, the crucial
considerations in this area concern the determination of the standard
of need and "available" income. It is Section 3 of the new act which
addresses these concerns. Since it was the area of standard of need
and "available" income in which HSSD encountered the most difficulty in the courts, and since the 1973 amendments effected substantial change in the statutory language, Section 3 is set forth in
full:
Section 3. STANDARD OF NEED-INCOME DETERMINATION.A. Consistent with the federal act and subject to the availability
of federal and state funds, the board shall adopt a standard of need
which shall establish a reasonable level of subsistence.
B. Consistent with the federal act, the board shall define by
regulation exempt and non-exempt income and resources. Medical
expenses shall not be excluded from non-exempt income or from
non-exempt resources.
Several things should be noted concerning these provisions. First,
the substance of these provisions is concerned with the same matter

formerly dealt with under Section 13-1-11, N.M.S.A., repealed pur93. See, e.g., Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. In. 1972). But see Parks v.
Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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suant to the 1973 amendments. Second, there is a significant change
in statutory wording. The previous statutory language mandated a
standard of need providing "reasonable subsistence compatible with
decency and health" whereas the new language requires a standard of
need "which shall establish a reasonable level of subsistence." The
possible purpose and effect of this change in language will be discussed shortly. Finally, it can be surmised confidently that the
statutory change was made in response to recent state court decisions
construing the previous statutory language. 94
The two subsections will be treated in reverse order. Section 3(B)
is an object lesson in how legislation should not be drafted. In its
first sentence, the section delegates to the agency the power to define "exempt" and "non-exempt" income. After thus determining
that this matter is best left to the agency, the next sentence reflects
that the legislature had some second thoughts on allowing the agency
to handle the matter and seeks to direct some limitation.
Exactly what the second sentence of Section 3(B) imparts is somewhat of a mystery. First, one can only wonder at what impelled the
draftsmen to utilize four negatives in one sentence. By the time one
finishes jumping four negative hurdles, he or she is so intellectually
exhausted that any ascertainment of the correct meaning of the sentence is sheer luck. The convolutions in the wording posed too much
of an obstacle even for the New Mexico Legislative Council Service.
In its official interpretation, the Council stated that the provision
"directs that medical expenses be allowed as a deduction in determining net non-exempt income of the applicant or recipient for the
purpose of meeting eligibility conditions." 9 5 While it is virtually
impossible to make sense of this sentence, a close reading reflects
that it cannot mean that medical expenses will be deducted from
income. If anything, the sentence most likely means the exact opposite.
The problem-aside from the unfortunate quadruple negative-is
that seeking to deduct or include "expenses" with "income" is an
exercise in futility; they are apples and oranges. "Income" speaks to
resources available to a person. "Expenses" speaks to what one
utilizes those resources for. They are not on the same side of the
ledger.
Despite the syntax of the sentence, a close inspection leads to the
conclusion that the legislative intent was that income devoted to
medical needs would be included in the income considered available
94. See text accompanying notes 51 through 58, supra.
95. New Mexico Legislative Council Service, Highlights of the Thirty-first Legislature 22
(1973).
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to the applicant or recipient in determining need eligibility. As such,
it seems clear that the purpose underlying this section was to effect a
legislative overruling of the Baca and Chavez decisions discussed
above.
Such a legislative intent makes explicable the change in statutory
language effected by Section 3(A). As noted above, Section 3(A)
substitutes "reasonable level of subsistence" for "reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health" as a standard by which
to test the standard of need arrived at administratively. The elimination of the "decency and health" language may be viewed as a part
of the legislative attempt to overturn the Chavez9 and Baca9 " decisions.
There are, however, two problems with reading Section 3 of the
1973 amendments as an attempt to overturn the prior case-law. First,
there is a practical problem. Even though the "decency and health"
language is eliminated, "a reasonable level of subsistence" must mean
something. In both Baca and Chavez, the records were clear and
uncontested that without aid, the individuals involved would die.
Just as those situations were found to be incompatible with
"decency and health," so they would also have to be found inconsistent with "a reasonable level of subsistence." Certainly death cannot be considered "a reasonable level of subsistence." Thus, the
change in the language in Section 3(A) cannot be considered to
overturn the results in Baca and Chavez. At the very most, the
change in language can be viewed as only addressed to some of the
broader ramifications of Baca and Chavez.
o There is, however, a more serious problem with reading Section 3
as overturning the prior case law. At least as to the AFDC program,
there is some serious doubt whether these cases can not be overruled
consistent with the federal Social Security Act requirements. Under
the Social Security Act, once an item is computed into the standard
of need for the AFDC program, it may not be eliminated-either
or administratively-without a demonstration that the
item is no longer "a reality of existence" for welfare recipients. 9 8
What this means is that before a state can eliminate an item from the
standard of need it must be able to demonstrate statistically that the
substantial majority of welfary recipients in the state no longer have
need for that item. 9 9 Thus, if the Chavez and Baca decisions are read
to interpret Section 13-1-11 as including medical needs in the

-legislatively

96.
97.
98.
99.

See note 57, supra.
See note 51, supra.
See Rosado v. Wyamn, 397 U.S. 397, 419 (1970).
See Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173 (E.D. N.Y. 1970).
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standard of need, then the legislative attempt to eliminate that item
from the standard would be ineffective without a demonstration that
most welfare recipients no longer have medical needs-a supposition
so unlikely as to warrant disregard.
As discussed above,' 0 while the Baca decision is not a model of
clarity, a logical analysis of the decision indicates that at the very
least, the court was interpreting Section 13-1-11 as a legislative
standard of need which did comprehend medical needs, although the
administration standard did not. If this analysis of the case law is
persuasive, then Section 3 of the 1973 amendments cannot be construed as effectively changing the standard of need.
4. Level of Assistance.
The statutory requirements governing the mechanics of determining the level of assistance granted and the procedure whereby
such assistance is to be granted are found in Sections 5 and 11 of the
1973 amendments to the Public Assistance Act. Section 5(A) of the
1973 amendments provides:
A. The amount of an eligible person's maximum grant of public
assistance is determined by deducting the total amount of his nonexempt income from the applicable standard of need. However, if
the amount of federal and state funds available for public assistance
is insufficient to provide the grants for all eligible persons, the
amount of grants to eligible persons may be reduced as necessary.
It is clear from this statutory wording that the process by which the
amount of grant to an individual recipient is to be determined does
not deviate from pre-existing practice. The amount of income available to the recipient is deducted from the applicable standard of
need. The product of this subtraftion constitutes the "maximum
grant" which will be given to the recipient. The description of the
grant as "maximum" in the first sentence together with the second
sentence of Section 5(A) indicates that the Department may set
grant levels at less than 100% of need.
The question then becomes what limits are set on the administrative discretion of the Department to set the level of assistance at less
than the "maximum grant" or 100% of need. A close reading of
Section 5(A) reveals clear limits on administrative discretion. It is
submitted that the first sentence of the section sets the norm for the
grant level: the difference between available income and the standard
of need. It is only the second sentence of the section which con100. See text accompanying note 56, supra.
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templates a reduction of the grant level from 100% of need. This
sentence, however, expressly limits such a reduction to circumstances
where "the amount of federal and state funds available for public
assistance is insufficient to provide the [maximum] grant to eligible
persons.. . ." Thus, read as a whole, Section 5(A) indicates that before the Department may reduce grant levels from 100% of need,
there must be a determination made that there are insufficient funds.
A necessary corollary of this is that any reduction so taken must be
limited to the amount necessitated by the insufficiency of the available federal and state funding. Thus, if the available federal and state
funding were insufficient to make grant awards at 100% of need, but
would be sufficient for grants at 95% of need, the Department could
reduce grant levels only to 95% of need and could not reduce grant
levels to 90% or 80% of need.
The critical importance of this provision is that the Department is
presently awarding grants at 94% of need. If the above interpretation
of this statutory provision is correct, the Department must revert to
100% of need, until it can demonstrate that there is insufficient
funding available to support grants at that level. Further, any reduction from 100% of need could come only after such a determination
was made consistent. with administrative due process.
Section 5(B) of the 1973 amendments poses further ambiguities
and uncertainties. Section 5(B) provides: "The [Health and Social
Services] board may set individual and family maximum grant levels
for each program." There was no similar provision concerning the
ability of the Department to impose maximum grant limitations on
recipients in the previous law. The term "maximum grant levels" is a
term of art in the welfare area.' 0 1 When a state is faced with the
problem of insufficiency of funds available to award grants of 100%
of need to all recipients, there are two basic vehicles whereby the
state may reduce grants. One is the "ratable reduction" whereby the
state awards a uniform percentage of need to all recipients. Section
5(A) apparently authorizes the Department to utilize "ratable reductions" in certain circumstances. The other method by which a state
may award grants of less than 100% of need is to employ "maximum
grant levels." Pursuant to this method, the state awards 100% of
need in its grants up to a certain level, but will award nothing beyond
that level. As an example, the state might impose a "family
maximum" of up to $320 per month for a family. Pursuant to this
maximum, after income is subtracted from the standard of need, the
state will pay 100% of the difference, up to $320, but will not pay
101. See Lampton v. Bonin, 304 F. Supp. 1384, 1388 (E.D. La. 1969).
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any more than $320, regardless of how much the deficit is or the size
of the family.
As may be seen from the above example, one of the key features
of the "maximum grant level" is the standard to which the maximum
is related. Thus, in the above example, the reference standard for the
maximum grant level was family unit. The state would not award
more than $320 per month per family unit. It is obvious that
maximum levels may be referenced to any number of different
standards. Thus, there may be maximum levels referenced to families
or individuals or particular individuals or to certain items in the
standard of need. Section 5(B) of the 1973 amendments, however,
authorizes the Department to employ maximum grant levels
referenced to only two standards: family .or individuals. It would
appear, therefore, that the Department would not have the authority
to employ maximum grant levels referenced to other standards.
This is an important limitation, since the one major maximum
which HSSD presently employs is a maximum referenced to an item
in the standard of need: rental expenses. Thus, pursuant to regulation, HSSD will consider rental costs only up to $37 a month for a
unit of 1-3 rooms, and $47 a month for a unit of 4-5 rooms and $57
a month for a unit of more than 5 rooms.'I 2 It can well be argued
that this "rental maximum" presently employed by HSSD is in violation of Section 5(B) of the 1973 amendments.
From the above discussion, it can be seen that by means of the
two subsections of Section 5 of the 1973 amendments, the legislature has authorized the Department to employ, in certain limited
circumstances, two different methods to reduce grants from 100% of
need: (1) the "ratable reduction" and (2) "maximum grant levels."
There is some serious doubt, however, whether the Department
could employ both these methods at once, consistent with federal
law. Several years ago the United States Supreme Court interpreted
Section 402(A)(23) of the Social Security Act as an effort by Congress to discourage states from employing maximum grant levels as a
means of conforming assistance grants to budgetary requirements.' 3 Since the Supreme Court's statement, several lower federal courts have interpreted Section 402(A)(23) as prohibiting the
utilization of both maximum grant levels and ratable reductions.' 04
102. E.g. HSSD Manual § 221.822 (B((i)(a).
103. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. at 413.
104. We believe, however, in light of Rosado that a percentage reduction of the
level of payments is under section 402 permissible only when the level of
payments is calculated on the basis of a percentage-of-need formula, and not
when level of payments is determined on the basis of maximums....
Utah WRO v. Lindsay, 315 F. Supp. 294, 300 (D. Utah 1970).
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The states may utilize one or the other, but not both. Under this
rationale, therefore, Section 5 should be read as authorizing the
HSSD to employ either ratable reductions or family or individual
maxima to conform grant awards to budgetary exigencies.
B. Special Medical Needs Act
In addition to the amendments to the Public Assistance Act, the
1973 legislature created a new program for the provision of medical
assistance to indigent persons. The Special Medical Needs Act 0
authorizes HSSD to operate the program, 1 6 sets up the statutory
criteria for eligibility' 0' and appropriates $250,000 to fund the pro1
gram. 08
It seems clear that the creation of the Special Medical Needs program was in response to the Chavez and Baca cases. In both Chavez
and Baca, the Department argued that a finding of eligibility would
require the establishment of a new medical assistance program. The
Court of Appeals, in both cases rejected the argument, emphasizing
that the decision in each case was only that the individual was
eligible to assistance under the AD program and would not require
the establishment of a new medical assistance program.1 9 In any
event, regardless whether the Chavez and Baca decisions required the
creation of a new program, by authorizing and funding a Special
Medical Needs program the legislature made manifest an intent that
persons in the Baca and Chavez situations should be provided assistance.
As in the other public assistance programs, eligibility criteria for
assistance under the Special Medical Needs program are divided into
"need" and "non-need" factors. Pursuant to Section 4 of the Act,
the Department is authorized to set up regulatory standards for defining the standard of need and available income and resources. Need
eligibility is established if an individual's available income and resources are less than the established standard of need.
The non-need eligibility criteria may be categorized into two
areas: (1) medical need criteria; and (2) incidental criteria. The incidental non-need criteria are substantially identical to the non-need
eligibility criteria common to all public assistance programs administered pursuant to the Public Assistance Act. Thus, an applicant (1)
105. Laws of New Mexico, Ch. 311 (1973).
106. Id. § 3.
107. Id. §§ 3,4,5.
108. Id. § 6.
109. See Chavez v. N.M. Health & Soc. Serv. Dep't, 84 N.M. 734, 507 P.2d 795 (C.
App.), Affd as moot 12 Adv. Sh. 403 (1973) (semble).
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must be a resident of New Mexico,' 'o (2) must not be an inmate of
a public non-medical institution,' 1 (3) must not be receiving assistance under any other public assistance program other than the
food stamp program,' 2 and (4) must not have made a fraudulent
transfer of his property in order to meet the need eligibility requirements.' ' I
The medical need eligibility requirement is set forth in Section 3
of the Act. This Section apparently limits eligibility to those persons
"who have a serious medical condition which will as a
reasonable
medical probability lead to death in the near future." Aside from
aesthetic considerations of withholding assistance until one has
reached the deathbed, this legislative standard poses substantial problems. First, one may seriously question whether the state of the
medical art is such as to be able to provide the predictions of death
which the standard apparently calls for. Equally important is the
problem of the temporal proximity of death contemplated by the
standard. Will a person whose condition will probably lead to demise,
but only after a long and protracted illness, meet the standard? If
not, does one have to wait until death is imminent? Why the "near
future" requirement was put into the standard is questionable. It
may be that the legislature recognized that death comes to everyone
sooner or later and wanted to reserve assistance to those to whom
death may come sooner. It is submitted that a better, more humane
and more workable standard would have been created if it were
written in terms of whether the medical condition, if left untreated
or uncorrected, would be a proximate cause of death. The legislature should consider amending the statute to that effect.
Some of the administrative problems concerning the standard,
however, are ameliorated in subsection B of Section 3. Subsection B
provides:
B. Such medical condition will be certified by an individual
licensed under state law to practice medicine or osteopathy. The
medical care shall be reviewed and approved according to regulations
of the board.
From the wording of this provision it is reasonably clear that the
determination of when a medical condition "will as a reasonable
medical probability lead to death in the near future" is left, at least
in the first instance, to individual medical practitioners. A reasonable
110.
111.
112.
113.

Laws of New Mexico, Ch. 311 § 5(A)(6).
Id. § 5(A)(5).
Id. § 5(B). Section 3(A) seems to further limit eligibility to aged, blind, or disabled.
Id. § 5(A)(4).
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interpretation of this is that once a medical practitioner certifies an
individual as having the requisite medical condition, that person is
eligible (assuming he or she meets the other need and non-need
criteria) immediately and must commence receiving assistance immediately. If the Department desires to create some administrative
mechanism for reviewing such certifications by individual practitioners, any such review must not serve to delay the provision of
assistance. Thus, upon certification, the individual would be granted
assistance, subject to possible termination if upon review, some defect is found in the certification. Such a reading of the statute is
supported by the standard which limits eligibility to those to whom
death is proximate.
Procedures for reviewing certification can often take a substantial
period of time. To interpose such a period of time between the
certification that death is proximate and the provision of assistance
would be an unreasonable reading of the statute, clearly inconsistent
with the legislative goal of providing assistance to persons who have
conditions which make death imminent.
The wording of the statute gives no assistance in resolving the
relationship of the Special Medical Needs Program to other programs
administered by HSSD pursuant to the Public Assistance Act. As
discussed above, the Department already administers a "Categorically
Needy" Medicaid program pursuant to the Public Assistance Act;1 14
and the 1973 Amendments appear to preclude the Department from
administering a "Medically Needy" Medicaid program. 1 I 5 Although
there are similarities between the Special Medical Needs program and
the "Medically Needy" Medicaid program, there are also substantial
dissimilarities which would preclude the program from qualifying as
a "Medically Needy" program under the Social Security Act. First,
the category of persons eligible for the program under the state
statute is not as broad as required for a "Medically Needy" Medicaid
program under the federal statute. Thus, the federal requirements are
that the program must be available to at least those classes of persons
who would be eligible for the four categorical assistance programs,
except for need.' 1 6 The state statute limits eligibility to persons
who would be eligible for the AD, AB and OAA programs, but
excludes persons eligible for the AFDC program.I I' Another major
conflict between the state program and the federal requirements is
that under the federal requirements, income expended for needed
114. See text accompanying notes 75 through 80, supra.

115. See text accompanying notes 77 through 79, supra.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (1970).
117. Laws of New Mexico, Ch. 311 § 3(A) (1973).
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medical expenses is not to be considered income available for purposes of determining need eligibility.' 18 The state program, on the
contrary, appears to mandate that such income be included in income available for purposes of establishing need.' I9 Since any state
program, in order to be eligible for federal contributions, must meet
the federal requirements, it would appear that the New Mexico
Special Medical Needs program would not qualify as a "Medically
Needy" Medicare program. For HSSD to represent it to the federal
government as such, and for the federal government to so accept it,
would require a flagrant disregard for both federal and state law.
Since the federal contribution to Medicaid programs runs from
50% to 83%' 2 0 of the cost of operation, one reasonably could assume that there would be a substantial advantage to the state in
opting for a "Medically Needy" Medicaid program rather than operating a similar program wholly out of state funds. The next legislature should consider amendments to both the Public Assistance Act
and Special Medical Needs Act that would allow HSSD to cooperate
with the federal government in administering the program as a
"Medically Needy" Medicaid program.
CONCLUSION
The recent trend toward federalization of the administration of
income assistance programs has most likely reached its apex for the
foreseeable future. As of January 1, 1974, state administration of the
AABD programs will be effectively ended. The states will retain administration of the AFDC program, the food stamp program, the
Medicaid programs and whatever programs a state may choose to
fund on its own. With the exception of the latter programs, however,
the federalization process has effectively removed administrative discretion in the area of non-need eligibility. Thus, it is in the areas of
need eligibility and level of assistance that the states have retained
any real discretion in the administration of the programs.
In the area of need eligibility, however, in the State of New
Mexico, HSSD has found its administrative discretion substantially
limited. The developing case law in New Mexico apparently has
found that the ability of the Department to include or disregard
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). See Fullington v. Shea, 320 F. Supp. 500, 504 (D. Colo.

1970).
119. LawsofNew Mexico, Ch. 311 § 4(B) (1973).
120. 42 U.S.C. § § 1396(b), 1396(d)(b) (1970). See Silver and Edelstein,Medicaid: Title
XIX of the Social Security Act-A Review and Analysis, 4 Clearinghouse Rev. 239, 239-240

(1970).
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certain items from the standard of need or the definition of available
income is circumscribed by relevant state law. Thus, the decision of
the Department to disregard consideration of medical expenses in
making need eligibility determinations was inconsistent with the
legislative standard of need.
The result of the recent federal and state trends, with regard to the
New Mexico administrative agency, has been to eliminate substantially the agency's discretion. Thus, in disputing any specific practice
or decision of the Department, one finds that the argument refers
more often than not, to relevant federal and state statutory requirements than to the sound discretion of the agency. In other words,
the argument is framed in terms of "You are not allowed to do
that," rather than in terms of "You should not do that."
It was in this context that the 1973 state welfare legislation was
drafted. In what manner did the 1973 New Mexico Legislation respond to that trend? It is submitted that the new legislation, whether
consciously or unconsciously, enhanced that trend by further removing discretion from the administrative agency. Virtually all of the
criticisms made in this article of the new legislation result from attempts by the legislature to circumscribe the discretion of the agency
in administering the programs. Thus, the problems that arise from
the federal takeover of the AABD programs and the possible state
supplementation thereto, result from the statutory language limiting
the life of those programs to January 1, 1974. There was no reason
to include such language. Yet the legislature felt impelled to put such
language in, apparently to make sure that the agency did not carry
those programs beyond the date of the federal takeover. Such a
purpose can only manifest some distrust of the agency.
The statutes are replete with such examples where the legislature is
attempting to administer rather than to legislate. The result, of
course, is to point out the obvious; legislatures should not attempt to
administer. They have neither the technical expertise, the experience
in intricate and difficult administration, nor the flexibility that administrative agencies have. The more desirable course of action
would have been for the legislature to identify the problem areas;
authorize the administrative agency to deal with those problems; set
forth broad standards for the administrative agency to use in developing its regulations and administration; and then let the administrative agency do its job.
The 1973 legislation may be criticized justifiably as both ill-conceived and badly drafted. The result has been to cast a cloud over
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possible action of the agency in meeting immediate needs and problems. The legislature has the opportunity to reconsider the legislation
in its 1974 session. It ought to do so. The problems of welfare
administration remain critical and pressing and one should not expect substantial reform to come from the federal level. The responsibility now rests with the states.

